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4 Accountability in the UK 
devolved parliament and 
assemblies 
Simona Scarparo 
Introduction 
The process of devolution in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales has 
adopted accountability as one of the key principles that underline the oper-
ations of the devolved institutions. Indeed accountability has been considered 
a fundamental concept (Glynn, 1993: 15), and 'an enduring and key notion' 
(Gendron et al., 2001: 282) in public sector management. The term 'account-
ability' means in general that someone is responsible for rendering an account 
about something to someone else. However, this term has been described as 
elusive (Sinclair, 1995: 219) and its scope and meaning has broadened into 
different directions beyond its basic definition of providing an account for one's 
actions (Mulgan, 2000: 555). Moreover, specific institutional arrangements 
impinge on the meaning attributed to accountability (Stone, 1995). In the aca-
demic literature, its definition exists in a variety of forms being shaped by social 
and political contexts (Day and Klein, 1987: 2). Thus, accountability 'reveals 
chameleon qualities' as at least five forms of accountability can be identified 
(Sinclair, 1995: 223): political, managerial, public, professional and personal. 
Day and Klein (1987) argue that the distinction between political and 
managerial accountability sets the framework in order to understand the 
nature of the problems encountered when trying to define the boundaries 
of what accountability is. Within the concept of political accountability they 
identified different models, 1 which are the expression of the evolution of 
social political democracy (Day and Klein, 1987: 10). Within this framework 
political accountability is defined as 'about those with delegated authority 
being answerable to people, whether directly in simple societies or indirectly 
in complex societies' (Day and Klein, 1987: 26). Managerial accountability 
instead is conceived as 'making those with delegated authority answerable for 
carrying out agreed tasks according to agreed criteria of performance' (Day 
and Klein, 1987: 27). Within the general criterion of answerability, the activ-
ities performed by individuals differ, therefore the basis upon which holding 
to account are different. Stewart (1984: 16-19) elaborates a concept of 
accountability as a 'ladder' which moves from 'accountability by standards to 
accountability by judgement': 
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• Accountability for probity and legality aims to guarantee that funds have 
been used according to previous plans and observing the appropriate 
rules. It also aims to ensure that decisions have been taken within the 
realm of power/authority. 
• Process accountability aims to ensure that the procedures used to carry 
out a task are adequate. 
• Efficiency accountability is focused on the way in which resources are 
used (best value for money). 
• Performance accountability aims to ensure that the performance achieved 
meets the set standards. 
• Policy accountability regards mostly the operations of central govern-
ments. It is concerned with the assessment of the policies implemented by 
governments and their standards, for which governments are accountable 
to the electorate. 
Much of the debate around the need to ensure accountability within parlia-
ments, governments and civil servants, in Britain, started three decades ago 
(Day and Klein, 1987). It was argued that the straight-line relationship of 
accountability (i.e. civil servants are accountable to ministers, and ministers 
are accountable to parliament) was fractured (Day and Klein, 1987: 33). 
Indeed the growing complexities and scale of governmental activity have 
intensified the need of accountability within parliaments, governments and 
the civil service (Stewart, 1984; Day and Klein, 1987; Glynn, 1993; Power and 
Brazier, 2001 ). The field of public accountability, specifically the formal rela-
tionship between parliamentary institutions and governments, has expanded 
the concept of 'what to account for' and how to do so, as Heald (1983: 155) 
clarifies: 
The growth in the public sector, both in terms of its scale and the diver-
sity of its activities, has outstretched the traditional machinery of public 
accountability, heavily dependent upon the formal relationship between 
the executive and the legislative. There have emerged alternative views 
of what accountability entails, involving different answers to both the 
substance and the form of the account. The concepts of accountability, 
which now dominate the debate, are political accountability, managerial 
accountability and legal accountability. 
(Heald 1983: 155) 
Thus, parliaments and governments have to provide a form of'public account-
ability', which takes the shape of an overarching umbrella (Glynn, 1993). It 
incorporates the different basis of accountability systematised by Stewart 
(1984) in his 'ladder of accountability', within the three dimensions identified 
by Heald (1983). Thus, political accountability encompasses (Glynn, 1993: 
18-19): constitutional accountability - which is the characteristic of parlia-
mentary systems; decentralised accountability- which allows decentralisation 
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of control; consultative accountability - which refers to the involvement of 
interested parties and pressure groups. Managerial accountability comprises 
(Glynn, 1993: 18-19): commercial accountability - which relates to publicly 
owned organisations financed by user charge and not by budgetary appropri-
ations; resource accountability - which calls for the adoption of managerial 
practices that will promote the efficiency and effectiveness of non-commercial 
entities by the establishment of an appropriate budgetary control framework; 
professional accountability - which relates to processes of self-regulation by 
professional groups employed in the public sector. Legal accountability is 
made of (Glynn, 1993: 18-19): judicial accountability - which refers to the 
review of Executive actions at the instigation of an aggrieved individual; 
quasi-judicial accountability - which refers to the control of administrative 
discretion, e.g. by review tribunals; procedural accountability - which refers 
to the review of decisions by an external agency, usually by an ombudsman. 
The definitions and representations of accountability so far considered 
provide a conceptualisation that depicts a hierarchical model. In order to 
work, the hierarchical relationship needs to rely on a series of assumptions 
that have been questioned (Day and Klein, 1987) leading to the debate on the 
'accountability gap' within the relationship between political and managerial 
acco un tabili ty. 
The 'accountability gap' 
An important aspect of the relationship between the different dimensions of 
accountability, previously identified, is to be found in the link between polit-
ical and managerial accountability. This link, which resides in ministerial 
offices, should be existent and effective. However, when analysing the role 
of ministers and the ways of discharging ministerial responsibility, Day and 
Klein argued that ministerial responsibility is divided into two important 
parts. Ministers are accountable to parliament for the activity of their 
department. At the same time, they are accountable/or the actions of the civil 
servants that work in their departments. The discharge of accountability to 
parliament is an expression of political accountability, while the account-
ability for civil servants' actions reflects managerial accountability. Thus, the 
discharge of managerial accountability of ministers depends on the extent 
to which it is possible within a parliamentary and governmental system to 
exercise some form of control of the activity. 
According to Barberis (1998: 451) there is an incongruity between the 
practical application and the doctrine of accountability in British government 
(Barberis, 1998: 451): 
Ministers are accountable to the public, via Parliament, for their own 
decisions and for the work of their departments; civil servants are 
accountable internally - and only internally - to their political chief .... 
Ministers cannot blame their civil servants when things go wrong 
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because if ministers could blame the civil servants, then the civil servants 
would require the power to blame the minister. Such would violate 
the impartiality and anonymity of the civil service, so undermining 
the authority of democratically elected ministers. And if ministers are 
impaired, so too is Parliament since it is through ministers that Parliament 
seeks to bring the executive to account. 
(Barberis 1998: 451) 
This incongruity finds its origin in the disregard of agency and public offi-
cials' personal responsibility, which is behind the choice of accountability and 
obligation (Roberts, 2002: 659). This choice leads to Harmon's accountability 
paradox and its relative pathologies (Roberts, 2002: 659): 
Paradox of accountability If public servants are solely accountable for the 
achievement of purposes mandate by political authority, then as instru-
ments of that authority they hold no personal responsibility for the 
products of their actions. If, however, public servants participate in 
determining public purposes, then their accountability to higher authority 
is undermined. 
Pathologies generated 
Atrophy ofpolitical authority Granting public servants the responsibility 
to establish public purposes makes public servants answerable only to 
themselves and enables them to covertly manipulate political processes 
that determine public purposes. 
(Roberts, 2002: 659) 
This paradox highlights the inherent problems of ministerial responsibility, 
which are generally recognised and demand new solutions (Barberis, 1998: 
452). The questioning of the effective capacity of ministers to being held 
accountable for the work of the civil service and the need to show to the 
electorate a clear link between policies and what has been achieved, has 
increased the demand for greater openness of the political institutions. 2 
Different mechanisms for assuring a more reliable accountability needed to 
be implemented. Thus, a number of initiatives, the New Public Management 
initiatives, were implemented from the 1980s and onward, which called for 
enhancing accountability through improving efficiency and implementing 
systems for measuring and monitoring performance. These are all elements 
that pertain to the realm of 'managerial accountability'. In a way, the 
assumption that efficiency and accountability are 'two sides of the same coin' 
(Day and Klein, 1987: 42) was developing, as the emphasis of the reforming 
process strengthened the idea that effective political accountability relied on 
effective managerial accountability. New Public Management initiatives were 
considered to enhance accountability, extending its scope beyond compliance 
(Sinclair, 1995: 219). The complexities of the relationship between ministerial 
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and civil service responsibility (Wilson and Barker, 2003) have been brought 
into sharper focus by the New Public Management initiatives, which have 
'exacerbated and made more visible existing fault-lines in the systems of 
accountability' (Barberis, 1998: 460). 
The Hansard Society's Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny explored 
the issue of how members of parliament (Westminster) exercise account-
ability. The Commission looked at debates, ministerial questions, inquiries 
conducted by select committees, and also the work of the National Audit 
Office and the Ombudsman. In addition, the Commission examined non-
parliamentary procedures of holding the government to account such as the 
work done by courts, regulators, inspectors and judicial enquiries. The result 
of the enquiry brought to light an inadequate and disconnected system of 
accountability. Governmental scrutiny appears to lack rigour and system-
atisation, and little evidence has been found on the ability of parliamentary 
enquiries to identify responsibility for failing by the Executive, and to make 
sure that the Executive puts into place adequate measures and follows 
recommendations. 
The report issued by the Commission, The Challenge for Parliament: 
Making Government Accountable, 3 reinforces the concept that Parliament has 
to remain the leading institution for guaranteeing accountability. It should 
use better the resources available, both external (for instance the enquiry by 
external regulators and commissions) and internal (promoting the role of the 
Select Committees). Better co-ordination of the different activities performed 
by the members of parliaments is advocated. The report identified seven 
principles through which objectives may be achieved (http://hansardsociety. 
org. uk/Challengefor Parliament.html): 
• Parliament at the Apex Parliament should be the leader institution for 
scrutinising the government. In doing so it should provide a framework 
for co-ordinating the activity of the different bodies responsible for 
monitoring the provision of government services. Members of parlia-
ment should incorporate the information provided by these bodies within 
a more formal and systematic appraisal of the Executive work. 
• Parliament must develop a culture of scrutiny The Commission suspects 
that members of parliament do not have a clear understanding of their 
role in holding the Executive to account. Thus changes in MPs' attitudes 
and behaviours are advocated. In particular, the commission highlighted 
the lack of cross-party activities, which leaves the task of governmental 
scrutiny to the opposition. 
• Committees should play a more influential role within Parliament The 
role of the select committees should be pivotal in making parliamentary 
scrutiny effective. The Commission suggests: 
o a better-defined role for the committees, with specifically defined 
responsibilities and pre-determined objectives; 
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o committees should take care of monitoring systematically the work 
of Executive departments and agencies; 
o committees should provide regular scrutiny of Executive agencies, 
regulators and quangos; 
o committee structure should be modified in accordance with new 
methods of work. 
• The chamber should remain central to accountability The commission 
advocates a central role of the chamber as the locus where ministers 
should be held to account. As a place of public representation of the 
House of Commons, it is considered as the main channel for informing 
and influencing the electorate, thus public interest and attendance to 
debates should be stimulated and improved. Regarding the content of 
the debates it is suggested that their capacity for scrutiny needs to be 
improved, with shorter debates and more time allowed for questions. 
Backbenchers and members of the opposition party should be given 
more chances for questioning ministers, and there should be time for 
cross-party public interest debates. 
• Financial scrutiny should be central to accountability The House of 
Commons is considered to hold a special responsibility for scrutinising 
tax and spending proposals. The Commission reckons that members of 
parliament are not fully performing their role in ensuring value for 
money of the Executive policies and in supervising that money is spent 
sensibly. Financial scrutiny is recommended as central to the work of 
parliament and the commission highlighted the need for promoting 
better procedures, which would provide the members with the necessary 
resources for exercising financial scrutiny. 
• Parliament must communicate more effectively with the public The Com-
mission claims that there is a strong need for improving communications 
and responsiveness to the public. At parliamentary level it is suggested 
there is a need to increase media coverage, and to render parliamentary 
affairs more understandable to the public. The committee should extend 
their range of consultation and better inform the public about their 
work. 
The analysis and recommendations of the Commission further reinforce the 
need to develop other forms of accountability. A more informal horizontal 
relationship (Roberts, 1991) is involved in accountability, which emphasises 
interdependence between political institutions and its members, and between 
citizens and their political representatives. Several authors (Day and Klein, 
1987; March and Olsen, 1995; Mulgan, 2000; Roberts 2002) consider the 
process of accountability as a 'dialectical activity'. This activity is shaped by 
two logics: on the one hand the logic of answering, explaining and justifying, 
informs the perspective of those who are asked to account for their actions. 
On the other hand the logic of asking, evaluating and judging, shapes the 
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point of view of those who hold to account (Mulgan, 2000: 569). Within this 
process, the role of information is crucial as it forms the 'raw material to 
account' (Stewart, 1984: 26), which in this context is considered to be 'a 
source of power, guarded by the institution rendering to account' (Stewart, 
1984: 26). Thus, the content of information to be provided, the way in which 
it is made available to those who hold to account and to a wider interested 
public, and the right to access, impinge on the effectiveness of the process of 
accountability mechanisms within parliamentary and governmental institu-
tions. Strengthening the concept of dialogue as a mechanism of account-
ability is envisaged as a way of rendering the process more transparent, where 
there would be production and use of information that is less controlled by 
the accountable institution (i.e. the Executive). In addition, it would create a 
space where appropriate information could flow freely, a space that would 
provide an effective forum for discussion and assessment. Finally, it would 
reinforce traditional accountability mechanism making participants more 
transparent and visible. 
The establishment of the devolved assemblies in Northern Ireland and 
Wales and the Parliament in Scotland has been interpreted as a way for 
enhancing democratic control and accountability in the UK (Midwinter and 
McGarvey, 2001: 47). The devolved institutions offer the opportunity to 
shape the relationship between parliament/assembly and the Executive more 
in harmony with the concept of accountability process based on dialogue. 
Devolution has been presented as a way for fostering a 'new politics' (Hazell, 
2003: 286, our emphases): 
The 'new politics' has pioneered a new form of civic engagement: it has 
attempted to build elements of participatory democracy into the work of 
the devolved assemblies, alongside the traditional forms of representative 
governments. The advocates of devolution promised that it would usher 
in a new kind of politics: more consensual, more participatory, more inclu-
sive than the adversarial party politics and political games played at 
Westminster. 
Accountability arrangements in the UK devolved 
parliament/assemblies 
(Hazell, 2003: 286) 
As discussed in the previous chapter on the process of devolution in the UK, 
the new devolved institutions have made accountability a key principle for 
their operation. In Scotland the report Shaping Scotland's Parliament issued 
in January 1999 by the Consultative Steering Group, appointed by the 
Secretary of State for Scotland for developing the practical operations of the 
Parliament, included the principle of accountability among the four key 
operational principles. In this document accountability is defined as follows: 
'The Scottish Executive should be accountable to the Scottish Parliament and 
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the Parliament and the Executive should be accountable to the people of 
Scotland'. 
This simple definition adheres to the straight-line relationship of account-
ability mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter. In Wales and 
Northern Ireland there is not such a formal statement of key principles 
underlying the formation of the new political institutions. However, in Wales 
the process of devolution has been associated with the strengthening of 
accountability (National Assembly for Wales, 2001: 1): 'This was a year of 
beginnings, creating our new and historic institution of devolved govern-
ment, bringing accountability to the three million people of Wales' (Rhodri 
Morgan, Welsh First Minister). 
In all the devolved parliament/assemblies the arrangements through which 
accountability is assured and discharged are very similar. The process of 
accountability has been designed involving three different levels, as shown in 
Figure 4.1. 
The full Pm·liament/Assemhly 
The full Parliament exercises its role of scrutiny of the Executive when debat-
ing in plenary session the legislative programme announced every year by the 
Executive, and any time the Executive presents a revised programme during a 
legislative session. In Scotland, the Consultative Steering Group suggested 
that the Executive should provide detailed statements regarding its political 
programme. The annual statement should present the primary aims, the 
objectives, the policy priorities and the ways (legislative, Executive and 
administrative) in which the Executive intends to fulfil them. Furthermore, 
the Consultative Steering Group suggested that the format of the statement 
could be an annual report, which shows the progress made in the previous 
year, provides explanation for changes, and it should present data on per-
formance review through the use of adequate performance indicators. The 
Holding the Executive 
to Account 
The Full Parliament/ 
Assembly 
The Committees 
Individual Members 
Interest Groups: 
Lobbyists, Media, etc. 
Figure 4.1 The accountability process in UK devolved institutions. 
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Executive financial proposals (the budget) have to be presented and discussed 
separately from the political programme. General debates on matters of pub-
lic policy can occasionally be held in plenary sessions. These debates can be 
initiated by the Executive, by non-executive parties, by Committees or by a 
specified number of members of Scottish Parliament. 
Another mechanism for enacting accountability is the vote of no con-
fidence. Any member should be able to present a motion for a vote of no 
confidence either in the entire Executive or in a named minister. In Scotland, 
this motion, which needs to be supported by a specified minimum number of 
at least twenty-six MSPs, has to be debated and voted upon. If the Executive 
does no longer have the support of the Parliament, the First Minister must 
tender his/her resignations and the Scottish Ministers must resign. If the 
Parliament approves a motion of no confidence in a named Minister, this 
does not cause the resignation of the named Minister. 
The committees 
The role of the committees is central to the issue of accountability. The 
Scottish Consultative Steering Groups suggested that the committees should 
be able to scrutinise the work of the Executive through different methods. 
First, it was recommended that committees should have the power to conduct 
enquiries and take oral and written evidence from Ministers, civil servants 
and others. 
Second, committees play an important role during the policy development 
and the pre-legislative process. The Steering Group devised a recognised 
policy-development stage, which would provide committees with a strong role 
in considering legislation (Report of the Consultative Steering Group, 1998, 
section 3.5:3): 'A formal, well-structured, well-understood process would not 
only deliver a scrutiny stage pre-introduction, but would also allow individuals 
and groups to influence the policy-making process at a much earlier stage 
than at present' (Report of the Consultative Steering Group, 1998, section 
3.5:3). 
Individual ministers present to the relevant subject committees more 
detailed information on the related part of the Executive's annual proposal, 
defining in depth their purposes and objectives; their arrangements for effect-
ing the plans, whether and who they intend to consult. At this early stage the 
committee would be able to exert quite a lot of influence on the development 
of the policy, and it would have also the opportunity of expressing any reser-
vations or complaints to the Executive at a stage early enough to have an 
impact on the Executive's operation. In this role committees are seen as 'the 
revising chamber' (Report of the Consultative Steering Group, section 3.5) as 
they scrutinise draft legislation, exercising a monitoring and enforcing role to 
ensure that all requirements are met. 
Third, committees are involved during the process of introducing bills. 
After a bill has been debated and voted upon in plenary session (Stage 1) the 
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bill is then referred to the relevant committee. In this stage (Stage 2), commit-
tees prepare a report to the Parliament as to whether or not the Bill should be 
approved, and comment also on the Memorandum4 that accompanies the 
bill. 
Fourth, committees hold important financial management functions in the 
budgetary process. Subject committees have the power and the opportunity 
to make recommendations on spending priorities and commission specialised 
reports which are prepared to tightly controlled budgets. The Finance Com-
mittee holds a key role in the budgetary process. It is responsible for address-
ing overall budget priorities; it is required to gather and consider the views of 
the subject committees and individual MSPs, and to scrutinise the expend-
iture proposals of the Executive. The results of the Finance Committee's 
analysis inform the debate of the Plenary on budgetary issues. The Executive 
should then take the outcome of the plenary debate into consideration in 
their financial plans. The Audit Committee holds the leading role for analys-
ing the financial audits reports of the spending agencies that are accountable 
to Parliament (for instance the Departments of the Executive, NDPBs and 
Health Service Bodies). In addition, it examines reports commissioned from 
experts which cut across different subject areas, working jointly with the 
relevant subject committees when required. 
The subject committees, the Finance and Audit Committees are able to 
scrutinise the accounts and the Scottish administration has to be held account-
able to Parliament for the way in which public money is spent. The Principal 
Accountable Officer and the senior officials, nominated by the Principal 
Accountable Officer for different areas of administration, have to answer to 
Parliament for their operations, through the Finance Committee, the Audit 
Committee and the subject committees. Furthermore, if the Committees are 
reviewing a specific issue for which the presence of the Accountable Officer is 
considered of help, in addition to or instead of the Accountable Officer the 
manager with specific responsibility for that issue can attend the committees 
and can be called to give evidence, both to provide examples of good practice 
and to justify actions when errors occur. This measure is evidently in contrast 
with the procedures before devolution, where Accounting Officers enquired 
into officials' work only when something appeared to have gone wrong. This 
new arrangement should allow committees to establish co-operation with the 
administration strengthening the accountability process, through the promo-
tion of a free flow of information between Parliament and the administration, 
and the openness and transparency of the government. 
In Northern Ireland there are three types of committees: statutory commit-
tees (also called departmental committees), non-statutory committees, which 
consist of standing committees (permanent committees of the Assembly) 
and ad hoc committees. According to the Belfast Agreement, statutory 
committees are designed to work in partnership with each of their 'target' 
departments, in conformity with the principle of power-sharing. Similarly to 
the Scottish subject committees, they have advisory, consultative and policy 
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development functions, and are responsible for scrutinising policies and legis-
lation brought forward by each of the Executive's departments. In addition 
they will have a role in the initiation of legislation and are specifically given 
the following powers (First Report of the Northern Ireland Commission, 
2002): 
• consider and advise on the Departmental budget and annual plans in the 
context of the overall budget allocation; 
• approve relevant primary legislation and take the committee stage of 
relevant primary legislation; 
• call for persons and papers; 
• initiate enquiries and make reports; 
• consider and advise on matters brought to the committee by its minister. 
Amongst the statutory committees, the Finance and Personnel Committee, 
similar to the Scottish arrangement, holds a key function in the account-
ability process. This committee has the responsibility for advising and assist-
ing the Minister of Finance and Personnel in the formulation of policy, 
policy development, and has consultation role with respect to matters within 
the minister's responsibilities. In addition, this committee has the central role 
of prompting the scrutiny of the budget proposals, considering and advising 
on departmental budgets and annual plans, and co-ordinating the Assembly 
Committees' responses to the Executive's Position Report to the Assembly 
(Developing the Programme for Government and the Budget for 2003-04, 
Resources Issues, 2002). 
In Wales, as in Scotland and Northern Ireland, there are subject commit-
tees and standing committees, but unlike the Scottish and Northern Irish 
counterparts, there are four regional committees, which look after the inter-
ests of the regions. Every area of the Assembly responsibilities is covered by 
one of the subject committees. They hold the following functions: 
• contribute to the development of Assembly policy in their area of interest; 
• scrutinise administration related to the implementation of Assembly 
policy; 
• scrutm1se the expenditure connected with the implementation of 
Assembly policy; 
• review the discharge of public functions by public, voluntary sector and 
private institutions in their policy areas; 
• take decisions in exceptional circumstances. 
(The National Assembly for Wales, 2001) 
Each Assembly Secretary is a member of the subject committee that covers 
their areas of work, in order to have direct contact with and immediate feed-
back from the committee. Differently from Northern Ireland and Scotland, 
the Welsh Assembly does not have a finance committee. The scrutiny of the 
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budget proposals is dealt by the subject committees, which are invited to 
provide their views on their spending priorities during the Budget Planning 
Round, and to examine and comment on the draft budget. 
Individual members 
Individual members of the parliament/assemblies can obtain information 
and hold the Executive to account through oral and written Parliamentary 
Questions. The submission of oral and written questions, which are intended 
to be used for obtaining information and not for political point scoring, has 
to follow a specific procedure (defined in the Standing Orders). 
Interest groups 
Having adopted a policy of openness, transparency and involvement of 
the citizenship in their operations the new parliament/assemblies can be 
easily approached by lobbyists' groups, and are more open to tight scrutiny 
of the media. Indeed local press can exercise strong pressure on members of 
parliament/assemblies and executives, as it increases their visibility to public 
opm10n. 
Accountability and the views of 'who holds to accounts' 
and 'who is held to account' 
The empirical research aimed to explore what is the comprehension of the 
different actors in the UK devolved institutions (i.e. politicians, civil servants 
and external experts) of the concept of accountability, and to map their 
notions according to the different dimensions of accountability previously 
illustrated in the introductory section to this chapter. The interviewees were 
asked to explain what they understood accountability to mean and what it 
signifies to them. Most of the participants held a broad view of account-
ability, and for the majority of them the most important element of account-
ability resides in the realm of public/political accountability, i.e. giving 
account to the electorate. The process of accountability is identified accord-
ing to the straight-line relationship between electorate, parliament, govern-
ment and civil service, where the line of accountability is considered clear 
and straightforward: the assemblies/parliament are accountable to the elect-
orate, the ministers to the assemblies/parliament, and the civil servants are 
accountable to ministers for their work on the ministers' behalf. 
Participants recognised, however, that accountability is a multifaceted con-
cept, which can be defined in different ways and involves different bases upon 
which one is held to account, and the different people to whom one has to 
render an account. At one level, accountability has been defined as 'political', 
which is associated with the process of representative democracy and with the 
role of the governments who have to account for their actions to the 'ballot 
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box'. On a different level accountability has been defined as 'ministerial', 
when referring specifically to the duties of ministers to account for their 
decisions and actions to the assemblies/parliament. And finally, there is the 
recognition that there is a 'managerial' accountability, which meant being 
able to identify who is responsible for doing what and to ensure that it is done, 
and also being capable and having power to monitor the use of public money. 
Among the participants, there is a general acknowledgment of the bene-
fits of devolution in strengthening the process of accountability within 
parliament/assemblies and the Executive. These improvements are associated 
with an increased level of scrutiny of the work done by ministers. The level of 
scrutiny has increased as a result of the enhancement of the opportunities 
for understanding what a politician does, or is supposed to do. The political 
structure allows having a focused group of people who are concerned with 
specific national issues. 
The positive effects of devolution in strengthening accountability have been 
attributed not only to the increase in the level of scrutiny of the Executive and 
civil service's activity, mostly exercised by committees, but also to an increase 
in the flow of information, openness and dialogue between parliament/ 
assemblies, the Executive and the civil servants. This has been described by 
the majority of the interviewees as a learning process, where ministers and 
civil servants try to engage with members of parliament/assemblies in build-
ing together an information system that meets their different needs. The new 
political structure favours the creation of more targeted information, which 
flows through a formal channel. It also allows facilitating and promoting less 
formal channels of communication especially between civil servants and 
members of the assemblies/parliament, which seems to have increased the 
opportunities to hold ministers and civil servants to account. 
However, there are some sceptical comments on the effectiveness of the 
accountability process and the procedures of communication and provision 
of information. Some members considered the provision of information 
too unstructured, with too many documents (for instance programmes for 
Government and budgets) that do not tie up together. Some members felt 
that the volume of information is really high but its quality needs improve-
ments in term of being sharper and more focused. In the Northern Ireland 
context, the criticism of the system is concentrated not only on the quality of 
information provided by the Executive, but also on the way in which its 
composition is determined. Criticisms have been raised about the way in 
which the Executive is appointed and how it operates. The assembly does not 
appoint ministers and they do not have any legal or political obligation to 
take into account what the committees might suggest. This lack of a 'sense 
of collective responsibility' reflects on the ability of the committees to exer-
cise properly their role in enhancing co-operation and dialogue among the 
political institutions. 
Other problems related to the capacity of the system to hold ministers to 
account, specifically related to the role exercised by the committees have been 
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highlighted by some Welsh Assembly Members. It is entirely a ministerial 
decision whether or not to take into consideration the suggestions made by 
the committees. To make the matter more complicated ministers are members 
of the committees. The thinking behind the arrangement of having a minister 
sitting in the committee of the relative area of responsibility, which is to be 
found only in the Welsh Assembly, is that this would build stronger links 
between the Executive and the parliament. Dialogue and co-operation would 
be enhanced, making ministers more accountable. However, there is always 
the possibility that ministers do not take on board the advice of the commit-
tees. Even more problematic, this arrangement could lead, paradoxically, to a 
decrease in ministerial accountability, as ministers could exert some pressure 
on the committees' members. 
Similarly, some doubts on the effective discharge of accountability of 
the Executive through parliaments and committees have been raised in the 
Scottish context. Some civil servants suggested that the media play a more 
fundamental part in the process of discharging accountability than having 
debates in parliament and committee hearings. The extent of the media inter-
est in what the Scottish Parliament and the Executive do has increased dra-
matically, forcing politicians to consider an additional level of accountability: 
a 'practical accountability'. 
Conclusion 
Devolution and accountability are strongly interconnected. The process of 
devolution has been advocated and welcomed by its architects and supporters 
as the way forward in order to strengthen political and managerial account-
ability. The empirical analysis of how politicians, civil servants and other 
actors involved in the devolved institutions understand and make sense of the 
changes in accountability, showed the merits and achievements of the process 
as well as the problems that still remain to be resolved. 
A positive aspect of devolution resides in the fact that it enacted a process 
of search for and experimentation of different mechanisms and procedures 
through which to regulate and shape the operations of the political institu-
tions and the relationship among them. The level of accountability, both 
of ministers and civil servants has dramatically increased because of the 
enhanced level of scrutiny exercised by the members of the parliament/ 
assemblies. Contrary to the Westminster arrangements, subject committees 
are given an important and central role in the function of scrutiny of the 
Executive's operations, which seems to be seriously exercised by the committee 
members. 
In addition, committees have the opportunity of participating more in the 
legislative process. This opportunity reflects positively on the accountability 
process at different levels. First, on a formal level, committees can impact upon 
the decisions taken by the Executives, as they have specific roles and statutory 
responsibilities for advising ministers, consultation at policy development 
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and pre-legislative stages, and key financial management functions in the 
budgetary process. Second, on an informal level, the operational mechanisms 
devised by the devolved institutions work in favour of developing a process of 
dialogue between the political actors (ministers and members of the parlia-
ment/assemblies), civil servants and the public. These mechanisms impinge 
upon the content of the information that is shared between parliament (those 
who hold others to account), Executive and civil service (those who are held 
to account). The arrangements made in order to empower committees and 
individual MSPs, the resources made available to them - for instance the 
creation of a parliamentary research centre in Scotland (SPICe)- do impact 
positively on the accountability process. They provide a better flow of infor-
mation and a less controlled availability of it to committees as well as back-
benchers. Civil servants have a more direct contact with the members of the 
parliament/assemblies, as committees can invite them to give evidence and 
to answer questions. In this way there is less ministerial interference in 
the relationship between parliament and officials, a positive aspect that 
provides a fertile ground for establishing more collaborative work and less 
confrontational exchanges between committees and the civil servants. 
However, the experimentation with new mechanisms and operational 
procedures is considered still a work in progress, a thought expressed by 
many politicians, civil servants and other members involved in the work of 
parliament/assemblies. Concerns have been expressed in the quality and the 
amount of information that is available to individual members and commit-
tees. The quantity should be less and the quality could be improved in order 
to allow members to exercise properly their role of holding to account. Fur-
thermore, criticisms have been raised over the ability of committees to hold 
ministers and civil servants effectively to account. The range of critiques varies 
extensively. On the one hand, some members express a very strong disbelief in 
the system, which is thought to be lacking in collective responsibility, as 
expressed in the case of the composition of the Northern Ireland govern-
ment. On the other hand, less strong but still critical views on the committees 
are expressed with regard to the inability of members to fully understand 
their role and to take full advantage of the potential of the system in terms of 
challenging and influencing seriously the Executive's decisions. 
Even though there is still progress to be made in strengthening political and 
managerial accountability, overall it is possible to say that the process of 
devolution has increased accountability. The devolved institutions have set up 
formal procedures at different levels (parliamentary, committee and indi-
vidual), with the specific aim of overcoming the 'accountability gap' criticised 
in the Westminster model. In addition, there is a renewed awareness among 
the members of parliament/assemblies of the importance of their role not 
only in scrutinising governments but also in collaborating with the Executive 
and the civil servants. It remains to be seen how far the willingness of mem-
bers of the Scottish, Northern Ireland and Welsh parliament/assemblies will 
progress in shaping effectively a 'new kind of politics'. 
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Notes 
1 The different models of political accountability identified by the authors are the 
following: Athenian; Feudal; Transitional; Simple modern; Complex model. These 
models move from a simple and direct concept of accountability to a more complex 
system of links between different administrative tiers related to the complex and 
diverse role of the state. 
2 Stone (1995) argues that ministerial responsibility is part of a broader principle of 
administrative accountability, and that the latter has been at the centre of a signifi-
cant and complex process of change. Thus, the author sustains that five main 
concepts of accountability are needed to better 'comprehend the practices which 
now constitute administrative accountability' (Stone, 1995: 523). Parliamentary 
control, managerialism, judicial/quasi-judicial review, constituency relations and 
market, are identified as the relevant and multiple systems of accountability, which 
coexists within administrative accountability. The issue, thus, becomes how best to 
combine these different systems of accountability without impairing the effectiveness 
of the administrative work. 
3 Hansard Society (2001) The Challenge for Parliament: Making Government Account-
able, London: Vacher Dod. 
4 The memorandum is a document that explains the need for the legislation, the 
options considered, the consultative process undertaken, the best estimated costs, 
benefits and financial implications, and the degree of consensus reached (Report of 
the Consultative Steering Group, 1998, section 3.5:7). 
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